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Abstract
This paper studies bargaining and exchange in a networked market with intermediation. Possibilities to trade are restricted through a network of existing relationships and
traders bargain over the division of available gains from trade along different feasible
routes. Using a stochastic model of bargaining, I characterize stationary equilibrium
payoffs as the fixed point of a set of intuitive value function equations and study
efficiency and the relationship between network structure and payoffs. In equilibrium,
trade is never unduly delayed but it may take place too early and in states where delay
would be efficient. The inefficiency arises from a hold-up threat and the inability of
bargaining parties credibly to commit to a split in a future period. The model also
shows how with competing trade routes as trade frictions go to zero agents that are not
essential to a trade opportunity receive a payoff of zero.
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Introduction

This paper presents a model of bargaining and exchange to study intermediation in networks.
The network perspective focuses on the study of markets in which existing relationships
matter for the interaction of economic agents. Such networked markets appear in a variety
of settings, including for example markets for agricultural goods in developing countries as
well as financial markets involving assets that are traded over-the-counter (OTC). Recent
years have seen a significant increase in such off-exchange trading1 which often involves
brokers and market makers that provide intermediation services. The network structure
of trade relationships amongst banks is documented by Upper and Worms (2004) and
Craig and von Peter (2010) who report a tiered structure in the German interbank market.
Their data match a core-periphery structure with many peripheral banks that do not trade
directly with others but only through the well-connected intermediaries of the core.
In this paper I employ an explicit network perspective on exchange with intermediation
to focus attention on the role and value of relationships used to facilitate transactions
between parties that otherwise might lack the opportunity to conduct trade directly. Such
reliance on existing relationships might arise from reputational concerns, trust or the need
for collateral provisions to be in place, for example from previous transactions. Existing
relationships may also help in overcoming significant search costs involved in identifying
trade opportunities or finding a suitable counterparty for more specialized asset classes. It is
the provision of intermediation in settings where such relationships are critical to trade that
this paper deals with. I present a model of bargaining and exchange with intermediation in
a network setting, investigating the patterns to intermediation and their dependence on the
network structure as well as the payoffs for intermediaries and trading parties.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the literature context for the
research questions investigated. Section 3 sets out the main model and Section 4 provides
1
The Bank of International Settlements in quarterly data reports the total amount of OTC derivative
contracts outstanding increasing from about US$ 80,000bn at the end of 1998 to over US$ 600,000bn at the
end of 2010, with a peak of US$ 673,000bn in June 2008. Source: BIS Quarterly Review, September 2011
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equilibrium analysis as well as the key results of the paper concerning efficiency and the
relationship between structural features and payoffs. Section 5 concludes.

2

Literature Context

This paper contributes to the literature on intermediaries as well as the the growing literature
on networked markets, and financial networks in particular.
The provision of intermediation services and middlemen activities which this paper
investigates in a network setting has been investigated in other non-structural frameworks by
several authors, with overviews provided in Bose (2001) and Spulber (1999). Intermediaries
have been credited with a number of different functions, including the provision of immediacy
(Demsetz, 1968) or acting as a screening device between different types of traders that
might be prevented from engaging directly with each other as in Bose and Pingle (1995) or
Brusco and Jackson (1999). In the latter, an intermediary arises endogenously to overcome
inefficiencies in trade across competitive markets. A seminal contribution in this literature
is provided by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), who investigate a setting with three types
of agents: buyers, sellers and middlemen. Trade is conducted on the basis of stochastic
pairwise matching and a steady state equilibrium is derived.2 A key insight of that paper is
that the outcome of trade and the terms of trade depend on whether the middleman take
ownership of the good from sellers or work on a consignment basis. In the first case, the
market is biased in favor of buyers, whereas in the second case symmetry between parties is
restored.
In the financial markets literature on intermediation in markets, classic contributions
include Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) who consider the impact of private
information in asset markets with intermediaries acting as market makers. An explicit
discussion of OTC markets is provided by Duffie et al. (2005) who construct a model of
2

In steady state equilibrium the outflow of pairs of traders which conclude a trade is exactly balanced by
an exogenously given inflows of agents.
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search and bargaining with buyers, sellers and market-makers. As the other papers cited
above, their model is free of explicitly structural features and thus does not provide insights
into the role of structural patterns, which are the focus of this paper.
In contrast to the work cited above, structural features are at the core of a growing
literature on exchange in networks, which has been a very active field recently with
numerous contributions. Seminal early works in this field include Corominas-Bosch (2004)
on bargaining in networks and the exchange model in Kranton and Minehart (2001). Both
adopt a bipartite networks approach, precluding an analysis of intermediation. More recent
contributions in this direction include Manea (2011) and Elliott (2011). Models which take
explicit account of intermediation are provided by Gale and Kariv (2007) and Blume et al.
(2009). The latter is probably closest in outlook to the present paper. There the authors
investigate a trading network with price setting traders. Traders set bid and ask prices
and buyers and sellers choose from the offered menu. The authors establish existence and
efficiency of trade equilibria and link payoffs to network structure, showing that positive
payoffs depend on the traders adding marginal value to the network. However, their model
cannot show that such traders indeed extract positive surplus as their framework permits
multiple equilibria, which limits predictive power. In contrast to their work, I consider a
setting with explicit bargaining in which surplus is allocated in a dynamic setting.
The literature on financial networks employs network tools to analyze various aspects
of financial markets, including risk sharing and contagion amongst financial institutions.
An overview is provided in Allen and Babus (2009). Babus (2010) provides a network
perspective to OTC trading and investigates the incentives for financial institutions seeking
to exchange assets to form relationships. In her model, links describe relationships which
allow banks to use repeated interactions instead of costly collateral to implement and
enforce exchange agreements.
Finally, at a technical level, this paper employs the framework of stochastic bargaining
games with perfect information analyzed in detail in Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1998) and
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extends it for use in analyzing games on networks. The contribution of the paper to this
literature concerns a new source of inefficiency in stochastic bargaining settings.

3

Model

This section presents a model of exchange with intermediation on a network. We consider a
setting in which agents’ interactions are restricted by a network of relationships. Agents
have access to trade opportunities that generate surplus, e.g. an asset trade between a buyer
and a seller. Agents are matched along the network of existing relationships and bargain
over the allocation of the available surplus within feasible trade routes. The bargaining
protocol allows for the random selection of trade routes as well as the identity of proposer,
incorporating the notion of competition between different alternative routes.
Players and Network Let the set N = {1, 2, ..., n} denote a set of agents. Agents interact
according to an undirected network denoted by G = (N, E) where the set of edges
E describes the set of feasible bilateral trades. Agents can trade with each other
directly only if there exists a link between them. As will be described in greater detail
below, trade between two nodes that are only indirectly connected is feasible through
intermediaries if there exists at least one path between them.
Trade opportunities There is an agent A ∈ N – the seller – who holds a single, indivisible
good that she can sell to each of a set of other nodes, B = {B1 , B2 , . . . }, who are
characterized by their valuation of the good bi . Remaining nodes in N have zero
valuation for the good but may act as intermediaries. I focus on a single trade
opportunity specific to a given seller, reflecting the notion of thin markets. This
assumption approximates trade in highly individualized products such as the complex
financial securities commonly traded in OTC markets. This is in contrast to thick
markets of more generic assets such as commodities or standard financial products

5
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where there may be many buyers and sellers in the market at the same time.3
Whilst this paper labels the trading agents buyers and sellers, the model may also be
interpreted as capturing other value adding interactions between two parties, such
as liquidity provision between banks, R & D cooperation between firms or joint
entrepreneurial efforts.
Routes For each buyer/seller pair, trade is feasible if there exists one path in the given
network G connecting them. We label the set of paths connecting A and a given
buyer Bi as routes. Depending on the network N for each given buyer-seller pair
there may be several feasible routes.
Matching and bargaining protocol The model operates in discrete time. In each period, traders are matched and bargain under a stochastic route selection and bargaining
protocol adapted from Merlo and Wilson (1995) as follows. At the beginning of each
period, a stochastic process σ determines both a trade route and an order of play
for agents on this route. Based on this draw, players that are on the route bargain
according to the order prescribed within the state.
Specifically, σ generates a state s ∈ S in each period characterized by three elements:
1. A buyer B(s) ∈ B and associated valuation b(s), representing the surplus
available if trade is concluded in this state.
2. A route R(s) ⊂ N connecting the pair of agents who have the trade opportunity.
Note that any R(s) contains A and B(s). The route is drawn from the set of
shortest paths between seller and buyer.
3. A permutation ρ(s) on R(s) which denotes the order in which the traders move
in the bargaining protocol. ρi (s) denotes the player moving in ith position.
3
The labels of buyers and sellers can be reversed without consequence for further analysis. The key
simplification of the model is that there is just one trade opportunity with one side of the market being a
single node.
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Following Merlo and Wilson (1995) we denote by κ(s) ≡ ρ1 (s) the first mover in
the order, labeled “proposer”.
To simplify the analysis, I assume that the process σ is independent across periods,
such that each period’s draw is independent of the previous period’s state. This
assumption allows me to dispense with conditioning on the current state whenever
expectations about future realizations are formed and is in the spirit of standard
alternating bargaining games. Much of the analysis will carry through to more general
stochastic processes with suitable modifications.
On realization of state s, trader κ(s) may propose an allocation or pass. If a proposal
P
is made, this takes the form of an n-dimensional vector x such that i∈N xi ≤ b(s)
which represents a split of available surplus amongst all players, allocating a share
xi of the good to each trader in N . The other traders on the route then respond
sequentially in order given by ρ(r) by accepting or rejecting the proposal. This process
continues until either (i) one player rejects proposal x or (ii) all players in R(s) have
accepted it.
If all responders accept x, the proposed split is implemented and the game ends. If
the proposer passes or at least one responder rejects the proposed split, bargaining
terminates and the game moves to the next period in which a new state – s0 – consisting
of both a route r(s0 ) and a new order of play ρ(s0 ), is redrawn and the bargaining
process is repeated. This sequence is continued until an allocation is accepted by all
players.
Payoffs Payoffs are linear in the share of surplus allocated, with common discount factor
β ∈ (0, 1). If proposal x is accepted in period t, player i receives utility:
ui (x) = β t xi

(1)

We assume that the surplus to be allocated is bounded above by b̄ ≥ b(s)∀s and thus
7

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2012

7

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 693 [2012]

ui (x) → 0 as t → ∞ without agreement being reached.
The model forms an infinite horizon dynamic game. Players take a decision in two
distinct roles: as proposer and as responder. As proposer, a player either passes or suggests
a split of surplus on a given route conditional on the route selected and being selected
as proposer. As responder, players have to decide whether to accept or reject a proposed
surplus division. A responder’s decision is conditioned on the selected route and proposer
as well as the surplus division on the table.
Note that bargaining in the model is multilateral and the good remains with the seller
unless agreement with all intermediaries on the selected route to the buyer has been reached.
Potentially interesting considerations which arise from the good “traveling” along the
route, such as hold-up issues4 or counterparty risk associated with disappearing resale
opportunities, thus remain outside the model. The setting here is more directly applicable
to markets in which intermediators act as a broker rather than a market-maker.5
Histories and strategies are defined as usual. A history is a sequence of realized states
and actions taken by players. A strategy specifies a feasible action at every history when a
player must act. We restrict attention to pure strategies.

4

Equilibrium Analysis

This section develops the equilibrium analysis of the model. We restrict attention to Markov
perfect equilibria (MPE) in pure strategies, that is, subgame perfect equilibria consisting of
4

See the discussion in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) concerning the difference between middlemen
taking ownership of the good and acting on consignment. A model exploring trade in networks in which the
good travels on a bilateral basis from seller to buyer is provided in Gofman (2011)
5
Reporting of corporate bond markets suggests that in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis brokers
increasingly showed the behavior implied in the model: “In the wake of the financial crisis and ahead of
tighter regulatory constraints, large Wall Street dealers have become far less willing to hold the risk of owning
corporate bonds, known in market parlance as ‘inventory,’ in order to facilitate trading for their clients.
Instead, they are increasingly trying to match buyers and sellers, acting more as a pure intermediary, rather
than stockpiling bonds and encouraging a liquid market for secondary trading.” Source: Financial Times,
November 8, 2011
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strategies which are history independent and condition only on the drawn state, that is, the
selected route and the order of proposals, and the offer on the table in the given period.

4.1

Equilibrium Payoff Characterization

A unique MPE in pure strategies exists and can be characterized through an intuitive set
of recursive equations using results derived in Merlo and Wilson (1998) and extending the
analysis to the setting of networked markets.
As additional notation, denote by (S µ , µ) a stationary outcome where S µ ⊆ S denotes
the set of states in which agreement is struck and µ(s) specifies the allocation that is
proposed and accepted if s ∈ S µ is reached. Associated with outcome (S µ , µ) is a stopping
time τ (a random variable dependent on the realization of σ) and an expected payoff vector
for each state s defined by υ µ (s) = E [β τ µ(στ )|σ0 = s] = E [β τ µ(στ )], where the last step
uses independence in the stochastic process.
Proposition 1. The bargaining game has a unique MPE, characterized by payoff function
f (s) as follows:
a. If b(s) ≥ β

P

j∈R(s) E

[fj (s0 )]:


hP
i


b(s) − βE
fj (s0 )

j∈R(s)\i


fi (s) = βE [fi (s0 )]





0
b. If b(s) < β

P

j∈R(s) E

for Proposer i = κ(s)
for Responder i ∈ R(s) \ κ(s)

(2)

for Excluded i ∈
/ R(s)

[fj (s0 )]:


fi (s) = βE fi (s0 ) ∀i ∈ N

(3)

The proof has been relegated to Appendix A.1. The equilibrium payoff function
distinguishes two cases:
9
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1. If available surplus exceeds the total expected value of moving to the next stage
for players on the selected route, then f indicates that the proposer extracts from
responding parties on the selected route all surplus over and above their outside
option value given by E [f (s0 )], leaving zero to traders not included on the route.
2. If available surplus in a given state s is less than the expected value of moving to the
next stage for players on the selected route, f assigns that payoff to each player.
Note that whilst excluded players receive a zero payoff in the first case, in the latter
case they have a positive expected payoff reflecting the fact that they may be included in
negotiations in the next period. The result allows the analysis of equilibrium outcomes and
payoffs for a wide range of possible trade networks and buyer valuations on the basis of a
set of equations describing value functions in a recursive manner.

4.2

A Solved Example

As an illustration consider Example 1 in Figure 1. There is a single buyer with a valuation
of 1 and two possible intermediation routes, both of which generate a surplus of bi = 1.
The state space thus contains 12 elements: two routes, three proposers per route and two
possible orders for responders for each proposer. For the purposes of this example we
consider a simple uniform stochastic process and assume that each state is equally likely
under σ. The states are listed in Table 1. Note that for the purposes of the equilibrium
characterization, many states fall into pairs that are equivalent. For example, states 1 and 2
share the same buyer, the same route as well as the same partition of agents into proposer
and responders. Proposition 1 implies that responders receive equal payoffs irrespective of
their position in the order of play amongst the group of responders.
By Proposition 1 equilibrium payoffs are characterized by the following conditions,
where Vi (j) describes expected payoff for player i in a state where player j is proposer.

10
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A

I1

I2

b1 = 1

b2 = 1

B

Figure 1: Example 1 - Two intermediaries
• For the seller A:
fA (A) = 1 − fI1 (A) − fB1 (A)
= 1 − fI2 (A) − fB1 (A)
β
[2fA (A) + fA (I1 ) + fA (I2 ) + 2fA (B1 )]
fA (I1 ) =
6
β
fA (B1 ) =
[2fA (A) + fA (I1 ) + fA (I2 ) + 2fA (B1 )] = fA (I)
6

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

• For the buyer B1 analogous to the seller.
• For the intermediary I1 (and analogous for I2 ):
fI1 (I1 ) = 1 − fA (I1 ) − fB1 (I1 )
β
fI1 (A) =
[fI (A) + fI1 (I1 ) + fI1 (B1 )]
6 1
β
fI1 (B1 ) =
[fI (A) + fI1 (I1 ) + fI1 (B1 )]
6 1

(8)
(9)
(10)

Solving this system payoffs for each state can be computed for each player:

11
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State s
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

R(s)
{A, I1 , B1 }
{A, I1 , B1 }
{A, I1 , B1 }
{A, I1 , B1 }
{A, I1 , B1 }
{A, I1 , B1 }
{A, I2 , B1 }
{A, I2 , B1 }
{A, I2 , B1 }
{A, I2 , B1 }
{A, I2 , B1 }
{A, I2 , B1 }

ρ(s)
{A, I1 , B1 }
{A, B1 , I1 }
{I1 , A, B1 }
{I1 , B1 , A}
{B1 , I1 , A}
{B1 , A, I1 }
{A, I2 , B1 }
{A, B1 , I2 }
{I2 , A, B1 }
{I2 , B1 , A}
{B1 , I2 , A}
{B1 , A, I2 }

κ(s)
A
A
I1
I1
B1
B1
A
A
I2
I2
B1
B1

P (s)
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12

Table 1: State space for Example 1
• For the seller A:
2−β
2
(2 − β)β
fA (I1 ) =
2(3 − 2β)
fA (I2 ) = fA (I1 )
fA (A) =

(11)
(12)
(13)

• For the buyer B1 analogous to the seller.
• For the intermediary I1 (and analogous for I2 ):
(3 − β)(1 − β)
3 − 2β
(1 − β)β
fI1 (A) =
2(3 − 2β)
fI1 (B1 ) = fI1 (A)
fI1 (I1 ) =

(14)
(15)
(16)

From these expressions ex ante expected payoffs are computed by multiplying each
term with the probability of the relevant state occurring. Expected payoffs are presented in

12
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1
2

Buyer  Seller

1
3

1

Intermediaries

6

Β
1

0

1

2

Figure 2: Expected payoffs for traders with two competing intermediaries
Figure 2 for different values of β, with the top line representing payoffs for buyer and seller
and the bottom line representing those for the intermediaries. Note that expected payoffs
for buyer and seller are identical, reflecting their symmetry within the network structure
and the stochastic process. Similarly, payoffs for the two intermediaries are identical.
The example provides an illustration how competition between intermediaries results in
lower intermediary payoffs. In particular, as trade frictions vanish with β → 1, payoffs for
intermediaries tend towards zero, replicating the outcome of a Bertrand-type setting with
simultaneous offers being made by intermediaries. I return to this feature of the model in
Section 4.4.

4.3

Efficiency

This section discusses the efficiency properties of the equilibrium of the bargaining game.
Given utility is linear in surplus received, efficiency is achieved by trading in states in all
states in which surplus on the table is larger than expected next period surplus. This is
13
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stated formally in Proposition 2. The proof is straightforward and has been omitted here.
It uses the independence of the stochastic process σ.6
Proposition 2. A stationary outcome (S µ , µ) is efficient if and only if trade is conducted
in all states s such that b(s) ≥ βE [b(s0 )].
The definition suggests two possible sources of inefficiencies: Trade may be conducted
too early or too late. Trade is conducted too early if the parties involved in bargaining on a
route agree to an allocation in a state in which it would be more efficient to wait. Trade is
conducted too late if the parties do not agree on an allocation in a state where available
surplus exceeds what can be gained from waiting. As shown below, the equilibrium does
not exhibit the latter type of inefficiency but may be subject to the first.
Proposition 3. In the MPE outcome of the game, there is agreement whenever b(s) ≥
βE [b(s0 )] and it is efficient to do so.

Proof. We proof the first part by contradiction. Assume ∃s̃ s.t. b(s) ≥ βE [b(s0 )] and no
agreement is struck. Then by Proposition 1:
b(s) − β

X



< βE fi (s0 )

(17)

j∈R(s̃\i)

Rearranging and combining expected payoffs from delay:
b(s) < β

X



E fj (s0 )

(18)

j∈R(s̃)

≤ β

X



E fj (s0 )

(19)

j∈N



≤ βE b(s0 )

(20)

≤ b(s)

(21)

6

For more general Markovian processes, additional issues arise in defining efficiency. See Merlo and
Wilson (1998) for the discussion there.
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where the last step establishes the contradiction.
Proposition 3 has an interesting corollary for the baseline case where all feasible routes
have the same surplus. In this case, efficiency demands that trade be concluded immediately
without delay. Thus:
Corollary 1. If b(s) = b ∀ s ∈ S, the MPE outcome of the game implies that trade is
conducted immediately and the outcome is thus efficient.
Proposition 3 implies that trade is concluded even along intermediation routes which
may involve relatively large numbers of intermediaries when shorter, more direct routes
are available. Thus, an intuitive prediction that it might be better for buyer and seller to
delay trade in such situations to avoid splitting the surplus with additional parties does not
hold. This is due to the fact that rents for intermediaries on the longer route are adjusted
downwards and reflect the constraint exerted by the presence of the shorter route.
A

I1

I2

b1 = 2

b2 = 1

B

Figure 3: Example 2 - Two intermediaries yielding different trade surpluses
Having shown that trade will never be unduly delayed, we consider whether trade may
occur too early in equilibrium. This is indeed possible in certain configurations which
we can construct with different surplus values across different routes. For some discount
values whilst delay would be efficient, the equilibrium outcome would involve trade taking

15
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place, yielding an inefficient outcome. The source of this inefficiency is a hold-up problem:
For the buyer or seller to pass in the low surplus state may lead to a state in which she
is responding and in that case the proposer would extract the available surplus from the
high valuation state over and above outside options. These outside options include the
unattractive prospect of reaching a low valuation state with positive probability, in which
case further delay would involve an additional period of waiting with additional discounting,
thus weakening responders. The fact that traders cannot commit to exercise their power in
states where they are proposing then distorts incentives for traders to “invest” in surplus
by passing in the low valuation state.

4.4

Structural Features and Equilibrium Payoffs

This section considers the relationship between structural features of the trade network
and equilibrium payoffs. One implication of Proposition 1 is that players excluded in a
state where agreement is struck receive a zero payoff, which is unsurprising given that
such players are not involved in decision making in those settings. As a consequence, on a
forward looking basis, players that may find themselves in such situations may be expected
to have their bargaining power reduced. I investigate this question first by considering the
way in which payoffs change as the number of competing intermediaries increases before
deriving a more general result by considering the impact of being “essential” to a trade on
payoffs. For simplicity, I restrict attention in the following to a setting in which all routes
generate the same surplus b in all states.
4.4.1

The effect of additional intermediation routes

To investigate the impact the number of intermediaries has on payoffs, consider a simple
setting with a single buyer and a set of k intermediaries that directly link to both the seller
and the single buyer for the asset (see Figure 4), each generating a surplus of 1. Expected
equilibrium payoffs for the end-nodes A and B and any intermediary I are then given by

16
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A

I1

I2 . . .

Ik

B
bi = 1 ∀ i

Figure 4: A setting with k intermediaries
fB and fI respectively:
k−β
k (3 − β) − 2β
1−β
fI =
k (3 − β) − 2β

fB =

(22)
(23)

As expected, payoffs for end-nodes increase with the entry of additional intermediaries.
Also, as previously observed in Section 4.2 for the case k = 2, as β → 1, payoffs for
intermediaries go to zero. The ratio of the payoffs is given by

fB
fI

=1+

k−1
1−β .

At k = 1, the

relative shares are equal and as k increases the ratio increases linearly at rate
4.4.2

1
1−β .

The effect of structural features on payoffs in the limit

The analysis in the previous section illustrates the impact of competition in a simple setting
with simple, competing intermediaries. One result of this analysis is that as trade frictions
vanish in the limit intermediaries receive an expected payoff of zero. This section shows
how the intuition derived from this simple example carries through to general structures.
Definition 1. A player i is essential to a trade opportunity if i ∈ R(s)∀s ∈ S.
17
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This definition formally captures the approach adopted in Goyal and Vega-Redondo
(2007). Structurally speaking, a player is essential if he is located on all possible trade
routes between the buyer and the seller of the good. As such, non-essential traders are
competing for the business of intermediating the trade opportunity.
Proposition 4. In an MPE of the game implementing outcome (η, τ ) the payoff of trader
i is strictly greater than zero as β → 1 if and only if the trader is essential.
Proof. We establish the result by considering first the payoffs of essential players as β → 1.
Let i be essential, then by Proposition 1, for states s in which i is responding, fi (s) →

E [fi (s0 )]. Adding across states and noting that by being essential i is either proposing
or responding, this implies equalization of payoffs across states, i.e. fi (s̃) → E [fi (s0 )] for
states s̃ in which i is proposing.
Now consider a non-essential player k involved in two states s and s̃ which share the same
route such that R(s) = R(s̃) = R and k ∈ R. Furthermore, let k = κ(s) and i = κ(s̃) with i
essential. Then as β → 1, payoffs for i tend to the same amount across s and s̃. Furthermore,
all other responding players will receive equal payouts on the route by Proposition 1. This
implies that also for k payoffs will equalize, i.e. fk (s) → fk (s̃) → E [fk (s0 )].
Finally, given that by Proposition 1 fk (s) = 0 for s in which k is excluded and such
states arrive with positive probability, equalization is only feasible if E [fk (s0 )] = 0 as
required.

Intuitively, the key distinction between essential and non-essential players is that the
latter have a positive probability of being excluded. This means that in the limit their
implicit discount factor remains strictly below one whilst for essential players it converges to
one. The result then reflects the basic intuition of standard alternating bargaining models.
Proposition 4 provides microfoundations for an analysis of competing intermediaries on
networks and maps the intuitive Bertrand outcome into the bargaining setting investigated
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here. As such it provides a justification for the payoff structure used in Goyal and
Vega-Redondo (2007), who investigate incentives for network formation in a setting with
intermediation rents. Whilst they assume that non-essential players receive zero payoff,
justifying it as the kernel and core in a cooperative bargaining setup, the present analysis
may provide some grounding for this assumption in a non-cooperative bargaining setting.

5

Conclusion

In this paper, I study a model of bargaining and exchange with intermediation on networks,
extending the Merlo and Wilson (1995) framework as a tool to analyze stochastic bargaining
games into a network setting. I characterize payoffs with a simple set of value function
equations allowing the analysis of efficiency and the impact of structure on payoffs in
equilibrium outcomes. I find that trade in settings with homogeneous valuations across
all routes, trade is efficient. However, with heterogeneity of surplus across routes, there
is scope for inefficiently early agreement in equilibrium, arising from a potential hold-up
problem. Competition between intermediaries is shown to reduce payoffs for this type of
agent. In the limit as bargaining frictions disappear, all agents that are not essential to a
trade opportunity receive equilibrium payoffs of zero.
Interesting issues fall outside of the scope of the present analysis and are left for further
research. These include further analysis of the impact of heterogeneity in valuations on
bargaining outcomes as well as the implications for network formation of the bargaining
model developed here, to compare and contrast these predictions with other work in Babus
(2010) and Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007).
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A

Appendix

A.1

Proof of Equilibrium Characterization Result

This section presents the proof of Proposition 1. The approach taken employs a fixed point
argument adapted from Merlo and Wilson (1998).
Consider the family of bounded measurable functions F n from S into Rn . An element
f of this family in our context represents a value function, with fi (s) giving the value of
agent i of being in state s.
We first establish that for any stationary outcome (S µ , µ) the payoff vector υ µ (s) is
characterized by a natural recursive formulation. The proof is in Merlo and Wilson (1998).
Lemma 1. (Merlo and Wilson, 1998) If (S µ , µ) is a stationary outcome, then υ µ is the
unique element of F n for which υ µ (s) = µ(s) for s ∈ S µ and υ µ (s) = βE [υ µ (s0 )] for
s ∈ S − Sµ.
Using Lemma 1 we proceed to the proof of Proposition 1 itself. Consider an operator A
on the payoff function f defined as follows.


n
hP
i
o

0 ) , βE [f (s0 )]


max
b(s)
−
βE
f
(s
for i = κ(s)
j
i

j∈R(s)\i


Ai (f )(s) = βE [fi (s0 )]
for i ∈ R(s) \ κ(s)





0
for i ∈
/ R(s)

(24)

The proof of the proposition then requires demonstrating f is an MPE payoff if and
only if A(f ) = f .
• ⇒ “f is an MPE payoff ” implies “A(f ) = f ”
Consider an MPE payoff f and fix a state s with i = κ(s). The best reply for responder
j to a given proposal x is to reject if xj < βE [fj (s0 )] and to accept if xj > βE [fj (s0 )].
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i
0 ) from making a proposal
f
(s
j∈R(s),j6=i j
hP
i
0
0 ) , the
that is accepted and E [fi (s )] from passing. Thus, if b(s) < βE
f
(s
j∈R(s) j
hP
i
0
proposer will pass and f (s) = E [f (s0 )]. If b(s) > βE
j∈R(s) fj (s ) , i will make
hP
i
0
0
a proposal that is accepted, earning b(s) − βE
j∈R(s),j6=i fj (s ) for i,βE [fj (s )]
hP
i
0
for j ∈ R(s) \ i and 0 for k ∈
/ R(s). If b(s) = βE
j∈R(s) fj (s ) , the proposer is

This implies that i can earn b(s) − βE

hP

indifferent with f (s) = βE [f (s0 )] again. Thus A(f ) = f .
• ⇐ “A(f ) = f ” implies “f is an MPE payoff ”

Assume A(f ) = f . We need to show that f is an MPE outcome described by (S µ , µ)
n
o
P
with f = υ µ . Define a candidate outcome by S µ = s ∈ S : β j∈R(s) fj (s) ≤ b(s)
and µ(s) = f( s) for s ∈ S.
First, we show that f = υ µ . For this we use Lemma 1 and show that f meets the properties stated there. Consider state s with proposer i = κ(s). Then f = A(f ) implies
hP
i
n
hP
i
o
0 ) . This yields f (s) = max b(s) − βE
0 ) , E [f (s0 )] .
fj (s) = βE
f
(s
f
(s
j
i
j
i
j6=i
j∈R(s),j6=i
P
µ
In the first case, b(s) = β j∈R(s) fj (s) and thus s ∈ S . Otherwise, b(s) <
P
β j∈R(s) fj (s) and thus s ∈ S − S µ and f (s) = βE [f (s0 )]. This shows that f (s)
meets the criteria of Lemma 1 and thus f (s) = υ µ .
Second, we show that (S µ , µ) is indeed an MPE outcome, by defining a suitable
strategy profile and demonstrating that no player can be better off by unilaterally
deviating. The strategy profile instructs proposers to pass unless s ∈ S µ in which case

the proposer offers µ. Responders will then accept, which yields υjµ (s) = βE [fi (s0 )].
Now, given future payoffs are given by υ µ , there is no incentive for any j to deviate
and reject. For player i, there is no incentive to deviate as µi ≥ βE [fi (s0 )] for s ∈ S µ .
Finally, for k ∈
/ R(s), the rules of the do not permit an action and thus no possibility
for deviation.
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